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BANKRUPTCY RULES AND PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
 






A B S T R A C T 
 
This paper explores the relative progressivity of the main bankruptcy 
rules in taxation problems. A rule F is more progressive than a rule G when the 
after-tax income vector generated by F Lorenz dominates that generated by G. 
We focus our analysis on four classical rules (proportional, equal-awards, 
equal-losses and Talmud) and on the TAL-family, introduced in Moreno-
Ternero & Villar (2002). This family depends on a parameter θ ∈  [0,1] and 
encompasses the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses 
rules and the Talmud rule. 
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 1I N T R O D U C T I O N
A bankruptcy problem is one in which one has to allocate a given amount
of a divisible good when there is not enough to satisfy the demands of all
the incumbent agents. It can be regarded as a particularly simple case of
rationing situations in which the only information available refers to the
number of agents, their corresponding claims, and the amount of the good to
be distributed. To solve this type of problem one uses certain procedures or
rules that implement some ethical and operational criteria. Diﬀerent rules
result from alternative combinations of these criteria. Therefore, a good deal
of the literature on bankruptcy refers to the analysis of the properties that
diﬀerent rules satisfy and their characterizations in terms of well deﬁned,
intuitive and sensible principles. The reader is referred to Thomson (1995)
and Moulin (2001) for a review of this literature.
In spite of its formal simplicity the bankruptcy problem is a model ca-
pable of accommodating a number of quite diﬀerent situations. The best
known examples are the bankruptcy of a ﬁrm, the execution of a will with
insuﬃcient assets, the allocation of equities in privatized ﬁrms, the distrib-
ution of commodities in a ﬁxed-price setting, the allocation of food supplies
in a refugees camp, sharing the cost of an indivisible public facility, etc. The
ethical properties of diﬀerent rules may help choosing the most suitable distri-
bution method applicable to each diﬀerent rationing situation. These ethical
properties usually refer to the equitable treatment of agents, the behaviour
of the rule with respect to very large or very small claims, the securement of
minimal amounts, etc.
The bankruptcy problem can also be interpreted as a particular taxa-
tion problem [e.g. Young (1988)], which is the one we shall endorse here.
It consists of collecting a given amount X>0 of taxes out of a popu-
lation N whose gross income vector is y. Therefore, a taxation problem
can be identiﬁed with a triple (N,X,y), with Y ≡
S
i∈N yi >X .A tax
rule is a mapping F that applies the space of taxation problems into the
space of allocations. The solution proposed by the rule F is an allocation
F(N,X,y) which speciﬁes the amounts of taxes paid by the agents, with
0 ≤ F(N,X,y) ≤ y and
S
i∈N Fi(N,X,y)=X. The after-tax income vector
is given by y − F(N,X,y).
We are interested in assessing the distributive impact of diﬀerent tax
rules, focussing on the notion of progressivity. A tax rule is called progressive
when agents with larger incomes should contribute relatively more. Most of
the actual tax schedules exhibit this property, which can be rationalized
3i nan u m b e ro fw a y s . T h em o s td i r e c tj u s t i ﬁcation refers to the fact that
progressive taxation produces a reduction in the after-tax income inequality,
something considered desirable when we interpret this feature as a sort of
compensation for diﬀerences in agents’ opportunities [e.g. Roemer (1998)]. A
second line of defence comes from the application of John Stuart Mill’s “equal
sacriﬁce” criterion. An equitable tax rule is one that distributes equally the
welfare loss induced by the tax burden. Therefore, if utilities are concave, the
equal sacriﬁce principle implies that taxes are increasing with income, which
in most cases implies progressive taxation (but not always). A step beyond
in this direction came from Edgeworth, who suggested that taxes should be
distributed so as to minimize the aggregate sacriﬁce. This principle yields a
rather extreme progressive tax rule (the leveling tax). The reader is referred
to Young (1994, ch. 6) and Thomson (1995) for a discussion.
Besides determining whether a tax rule is progressive or not, one can
also be interested in comparing the relative progressivity of diﬀerent rules in
terms of their outcomes. A tax rule F will be declared “more progressive”
than another tax rule G if, for any given taxation problem (N,X,y), F yields
an after-tax income distribution that Lorenz dominates that generated by G.
The assessment of the distributive properties of bankruptcy rules by means
of the classical Lorenz dominance criterion can be found in Moulin (1988, ch.
6) and, more recently, in Hougaard & Thorlund-Petersen (2001).
There are in the literature four classical solutions to the bankruptcy prob-
lem, that are applicable to the taxation problem: the proportional rule, the
constrained equal awards rule (that here corresponds to the head tax), the
constrained equal losses rule (here the leveling tax), and the Talmud rule
[see Herrero & Villar (2001) for a comparative analysis]. The ﬁrst three
rules implement the idea of equal division, with diﬀerent reference variables
(ratios, contributions, and after-tax incomes, respectively). The last three
rules can be regarded as part of a parametric family of rules introduced in
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2002) under the name of the TAL-family. For each
θ ∈ [0,1] the rule Fθ in this family implements the following protective cri-
terion: no agent will pay more (resp. less) than a fraction θ of her income
if the tax burden X is below (resp. above) θ times the aggregate income S
i∈N yi. The rule associated with θ = 1
2 i st h eT a l m u dr u l ew h e r e a st h e
extreme values θ =1and θ =0correspond to the head tax and the leveling
tax, respectively. The proportional solution is not part of this family.
We analyze in this paper the progressivity of all these rules, both in
absolute and relative terms. The domain of problems on which these rules
are progressive is considered ﬁrst. Clearly the proportional solution is not
progressive (even though it satisﬁes a weak form of this property). We show
that a rule Fθ in the TAL-family exhibits progressivity on the domain of tax
4problems (N,X,y) in which θ < X
Y , and only on this domain. Indeed, the
only rule that satisﬁes progressivity on an unrestricted domain is the leveling
tax.
The analysis of the relative progressivity of these rules comes next. The
proportional rule and the Talmud rule are more progressive than the head tax
and less progressive than the leveling tax, as expected. More interestingly,
we show that all the members of the TAL-family can be ordered in terms of
relative progressivity, according to the value of the parameter θ. In particular,
if θ1, θ2 ∈ [0,1] are such that θ1 ≤ θ2,t h e nFθ1 is more progressive than Fθ2.
Therefore, the parameter θ that generates the rules in the TAL-family can
be given a very precise interpretation as an index of progressivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
model. The behaviour of the rules with respect to the progressivity criteria
is discussed in Section 3. The proof of the main theorem is relegated to an
Appendix.
2T H E M O D E L
Let N represent the set of all potential agents (a set with an inﬁnite number
of members) and let N be the family of all ﬁnite subsets of N. An element
N ∈ N describes a ﬁnite set of agents N = {1,2,...,n},w h e r ew et a k e|N| =
n.Ataxation problem is a triple (N,X,y), where N is the set of agents,
X ∈ R+ represents the tax burden (the amount of taxes to be collected),
and y ∈ Rn
+ is the agents’ gross income vector whose ith component is yi. It
will be assumed throughout the paper that
S
i∈N yi >X>0. The family of
all those taxation problems is X. To simplify notation we write, for any given
problem (N,X,y) ∈ X,Y=
S
i∈N yi. We assume, without loss of generality,
that agents are labelled so that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ... ≤ yn.
Deﬁnition 1 A rule is a mapping F that associates with every (N,X,y) ∈
X a unique point F(N,X,y) ∈ Rn such that:




The point F(N,X,y) represents a fair way of allocating the tax burden X
among the agents in N. Requirement (i) is that each agent pays an amount
that is non-negative and bounded above by her income. Requirement (ii)




i=1 xi = X, with xi ≤ yi, for all i =1 ,...,n} is the set of feasible
allocations.T h eafter-tax income vector is given by y−F(N,X,y) ∈ Rn
+.
5Given a rule F we deﬁne its dual F∗ as follows [Cf. Aumann & Maschler
(1985)]: For all (N,X,y) ∈ X, F∗(N,X,y)=y − F(N,Y − X,y). When a
rule and its dual produce the same outcomes is called self-dual. The notion
of duality is extended to the properties a rule satisﬁes in an obvious way
(namely, P∗ is the dual property of P if for every rule F it is true that F
satisﬁes P if and only if its dual rule F∗ satisﬁes P∗).
We now consider four classical tax rules: the proportional rule, the head
tax, the leveling tax, and the Talmud rule. The ﬁrst three rules apply an
egalitarian criterion and diﬀer in the variables they equalize. The propor-
tional rule solves the problem dividing the tax burden so that each agent pays
an equal share of her income. The head tax is basically a ﬂat tax that dis-
tributes the tax burden uniformly, provided no agent ends up paying above
her income. The leveling tax rule aims at equalizing after-tax income across
the agents, with one proviso: all contributions are non-negative. Finally,
the Talmud rule behaves like the head tax or the leveling tax, depending on
whether the tax burden exceeds or falls short of half the total income. In
particular, nobody pays more than half of her income if the tax burden is
less than half of the aggregate income and nobody pays less than half of her
income if the tax burden exceeds half of the total income.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 2 The proportional tax (P) is the rule that, for all (N,X,y) ∈
X, and all i ∈ N, yields:
Pi(N,X,y)=λ · yi
where λ > 0 is chosen so that
S
i∈N λ · yi = X.
Deﬁnition 3 The head tax (A) is the rule that, for all (N,X,y) ∈ X, and
all i ∈ N, yields:
Ai(N,X,y)=m i n {yi,λ}
where λ > 0 is chosen so that
S
i∈N min{yi,λ} = X.
Deﬁnition 4 The leveling tax (L) is the rule that, for all (N,X,y) ∈ X,
and all i ∈ N, yields:
Li(N,X,y)=m a x {0,y i − λ}
where λ > 0 is chosen so that
S
i∈N max{0,y i − λ} = X.
6Deﬁnition 5 The Talmud (T) is the rule that, for all (N,X,y) ∈ X, and




2yi,λ} if X ≤ 1
2Y
max{1
2yi,y i − µ} if X ≥ 1
2Y
where λ and µ are chosen so that
S
i∈N Ti(N,X,y)=X.
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2002) introduce a family of rules, called the
TAL-family, that generalizes the Talmud rule and encompasses both the head
tax and the leveling tax rules. This family is generated by applying the
principle underlying the Talmud rule to all the rules that solve the taxation
problem depending on the relation between X and θY,for θ ∈ [0,1]. Formally:
Deﬁnition 6 The TAL-family consists of all rules with the following form:





min{θyi,λ} if X ≤ θY
max{θyi,y i − µ} if X ≥ θY




Ar u l eFθ in the TAL-family resolves taxation problems according to the
following principle: Nobody pays more than a fraction θ of her income if the
tax burden is less than θ times the gross national income and nobody pays less
than a fraction θ of her income if the amount of taxes to be collected exceeds
θ times the aggregate income. Note that the leveling tax rule corresponds
to the case θ =0(F0 = L), whereas the head tax corresponds to the other
extreme value, θ =1( F1 = A). Obviously the Talmud rule is obtained for
θ = 1
2 (F1/2 = T). The parameter θ can be interpreted as a measure of the
distributive power of the rule. The next section conveys a precise meaning
to this interpretation of θ.
Note that the proportional tax schedule is not a member of the TAL-
family. In other words, there is no θ for which Fθ is the proportional rule.




Y (N,X,y) that coincides with the allocation provided by the pro-
portional tax schedule to this taxation problem. This fact will be important
in the ensuing discussion.
Remark 1 Ar u l ei nt h eT A L - f a m i l yc a na l s ob ee x p r e s s e da saf u n c t i o no f
the head tax and the leveling tax rules, as follows: Fθ (N,X,y)=A(N,X,θy)
if θY ≥ X and Fθ (N,X,y)=θy + L(N,X − θY,(1 − θ)y) otherwise.
73 PROGRESSIVITY ANALYSIS
The notions of progressivity and regressivity refer to the behaviour of the
tax shares Fi(.)/yi with respect to the income level yi. Progressivity (resp.
regressivity) requires larger incomes to contribute proportionally more (resp.
less) to the collection of an amount X of taxes.
The formal deﬁn i t i o no ft h e s ep r o p e r t i e si sa sf o l l o w s :
Deﬁnition 7 (Progressivity / Regressivity) Ar u l eF is progressive
(resp. regressive)o nD ⊂ X if, for all (N,X,y) ∈ D and for all i, j ∈ N,








yj ), with at least
one strict inequality.
It is easy to see that the head tax satisﬁes regressivity on X whereas the
leveling tax satisﬁes progressivity on X. The Talmud rule satisﬁes neither
progressivity nor regressivity on this unrestricted domain. The proportional
rule cannot satisfy any of these properties (even though it is the rule that
satisﬁes simultaneously a weaker version of both).1
More generally, it is worth noting that progressivity and regressivity are
dual properties (that is, a rule F exhibits regressivity if and only if its dual
rule F∗ exhibits progressivity). Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2002, Prop. 1)
show that F1−θ is the dual rule of Fθ, for all θ ∈ [0,1], so that when applying
these properties to the TAL-family we already know that Fθ exhibits pro-
gressivity if and only if F1−θ exhibits regressivity. Moreover, as progressivity
and regressivity are mutually exclusive concepts, there is no self-dual rule
satisfying any of these properties on the unrestricted domain X of taxation
problems.
Let τ(N,X,y)=X
Y stand for the share of the tax burden in the aggregate
income, and deﬁne
D
δ = {(N,X,y) ∈ X : τ (N,X,y)=δ}
for each δ ∈ (0,1). In other words, Dδ is the set of taxation problems
whose tax share is δ. The following result shows a rule in the TAL-family is
progressive on Dδ if and only if θ < δ. Formally:
Theorem 1 Let {Fθ}θ∈[0,1] denote the TAL-family, and let δ ∈ (0,1) be
given. Then:
(i) If θ < δ then Fθ exhibits progressivity on Dδ.
(ii) If θ > δ then Fθ exhibits regressivity on Dδ.
(iii) If θ = δ then Fθ exhibits neither progressivity nor regressivity on Dδ.
1By a weaker version we mean that yi >y j implies Fi(.)/yi ≥ Fj(.)/yj (resp. ≤),
without requiring any strict inequality.
8Proof.
Let δ ∈ (0,1) be given and consider its corresponding domain of taxation
problems Dδ.L e t (N,X,y) ∈ Dδ and consider i, j ∈ N such that yi >y j.
Let also θ ∈ [0,1].
(i) If θ < δ,i tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition, that Fθ
i (N,X,y)=m a x {θyi,y i−
λ}, for all i ∈ N.S u p p o s e ﬁrst that λ ≤ (1 − θ)yj.I n s u c h a c a s e
Fθ
i (N,X,y)=yi − λ,a n dFθ








yi > θ =
Fj(N,X,y)
yj . Finally, suppose that λ ≥ (1 − θ)yi. Then,
Fi(N,X,y)
yi = θ =
Fj(N,X,y)
yj .
To conclude this case, let us see that there exists at least a pair of agents




yj . Otherwise, the above
reasoning would imply λ ≥ (1 − θ)yi for all i ∈ N. This ensures that
Fθ
i (N,X,y)=θyi for all i ∈ N,a n dt h e r e f o r eX = θY ,w h i c hi sac o n t r a d i c -
tion, since θ < δ. The proof of case (i) is in this way completed. Moreover,
it follows that F0 = L exhibits progressivity on ∪δ∈(0,1)Dδ = X.
(ii) If θ > δ (i.e. X<θY )t h e n ,Fθ
i (N,X,y)=m i n {θyi,λ},f o ra l l
i ∈ N.S u p p o s e ﬁrst that λ ≤ θyj. I ns u c hac a s eFθ
i (N,X,y)=λ =
Fθ








yi < θ =
Fj(N,X,y)
yj . Finally, suppose that λ ≥ θyi. Then,
Fi(N,X,y)
yi = θ =
Fj(N,X,y)
yj .
To conclude this case, let us see that there exists at least a pair of agents




yj . Otherwise, the above
reasoning would imply λ ≥ θyi for all i ∈ N. This ensures that Fθ
i (N,X,y)=
θyi for all i ∈ N, and therefore X = θY , which is a contradiction, since
θ > δ. The proof of case (ii) is in this way completed. Moreover, it follows
that F1 = A exhibits regressivity on ∪δ∈(0,1)Dδ = X.
(iii) Finally, it is straightforward to see that if θ = δ,t h e nFθ
i (N,X,y)=
θyi for all i ∈ N, which implies
Fi(N,X,y)
yi = θ for all i ∈ N.
Remark 2 The income tax burden in real economies is usually well below 20
% of the national income. Therefore, the Talmud rule is typically a regressive
tax schedule.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1 Let {Fθ}θ∈[0,1] denote the TAL-family. Then:
(i) Fθ exhibits progressivity on X if and only if θ =0 .
9(ii) Fθ exhibits regressivity on X if and only if θ =1 .
Redressing inequality is one of the basic goals of progressive taxation. A
progressive tax schedule yields an after-tax income which is more egalitarian
than the original income distribution. It is then natural to consider that a
tax schedule F is more progressive than a tax schedule G if it generates a
more egalitarian after-tax income distribution. Fortunately, it is well estab-
lished in the literature on economic inequality that one can speak safely of
income distribution x being “more egalitarian” than income distribution x ,
when the Lorenz curve associated with x lies everywhere above that associ-
ated with x . The Lorenz dominance criterion can be regarded as the most
fundamental principle for the evaluation of income inequality, even though
it is only a partial ordering. It is therefore sensible to apply this principle to
the evaluation of the relative progressivity of tax schedules.2
Consider now the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 8 Let x,z ∈ Rn be two given vectors whose components are in-





i=1 zi. We say that vector x Lorenz dominates vec-




i=1 zi,f o ra l l
k =1 ,...,n− 1.
The Lorenz dominance criterion induces a partial ordering on the alloca-
tions which reﬂects their relative spread. The expression x L z means that
the distribution x is unambiguously “more egalitarian” than the distribution
z. It is well known that this property is equivalent to saying that z can be
obtained from x by means of a ﬁnite collection of transfers “from the richer to
the poorer”, and that I(z) >I (x) for any sensible inequality index I(·) [see
Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen & Starret (1973), and Rostchild & Stiglitz
(1973)].
Concerning taxation note that, for any two rules F, G and a problem
(N,X,y) ∈ X,F (N,X,y) L G(N,X,y) if and only if y − G(N,X,y) L
y − F(N,X,y). That is to say, if the vector of contributions with a tax rule
F Lorenz dominates that with a tax rule G, then the after-tax income vector
generated by G Lorenz dominates that generated by F. This motivates the
following:
Deﬁnition 9 (Relative progressivity) Ar u l eF is said more progres-
sive than a rule G on a domain D ⊂ X, which we write F ∗
D G, when for
2Some of the best known contributions to the theory of economic inequality are Lorenz
(1905), Dalton (1920), Sen (1973), and Atkinson (1975).
10all taxation problems (N,X,y) ∈ D,y−F(N,X,y) L y − G(N,X,y). If F
is more progressive than G on the whole domain X of taxation problems, we
simply say that F is more progressive than G, and write F ∗ G.
The content of this notion is clear. A tax rule F is more progressive than
at a xr u l eG on a domain D ⊂ X when F yields an after-tax income vector
that is more egalitarian than that generated by G, for each admissible prob-
lem. Alternatively, F is more progressive than G if, for any given problem
(N,X,y) ∈ D ⊂ X, the after-tax income distribution y − F(N,X,y) can be
obtained from the after-tax income distribution y−G(N,X,y), by a sequence
of income transfers from the richer to the poorer.
Let (N,X,y) ∈ X be a taxation problem and let z be an arbitrary point
in the feasible set Ω(N,X,y). It is easy to see that A(N,X,y) L z and
y−L(N,X,y) L y−z. This simply follows from the fact that L(N,X,y) is
the closest point to y in the feasible set Ω(N,X,y) whereas A(N,X,y) is the
closest point to equal division in that set [see for instance Moulin (1988, ch.
6)]. As a consequence, we immediately deduce that L ∗ P ∗ A, and also
that L ∗ T ∗ A. That is, the leveling tax is more progressive than either
the proportional or the Talmud rule, which in turn are more progressive than
the head tax.
The main result of the paper, which is presented next, extends these
relations. In particular, it shows that all the rules in the TAL-family can be
ranked according to the relative progressivity principle on the unrestricted
domain X,s ot h a tθ1 ≤ θ2 implies that Fθ1 is more progressive than Fθ2.
Formally:
Theorem 2 Let Fθ1,F θ2 be two rules in the TAL-family, with θ1,θ2 ∈ [0,1].
Then, Fθ1 ∗ Fθ2 when θ1 ≤ θ2.
(The proof is given in the Appendix)
Theorem 2 conveys a very precise content to the interpretation of the
parameter θ as an index of the distributive power of the rule Fθ.F o ra n yg i v e n
taxation problem (N,X,y) ∈ X, the allocation proposed by the Fθ yields
an after-tax income vector that becomes more egalitarian as θ decreases.
Therefore, the rules in the TAL-Family are fully ranked according to the
progressivity principle, depending monotonically on the parameter θ.
>From this result we can also provide a clear assessment on the relative
progressivity of the proportional rule with respect to other rules within the
TAL-family, recurring once more to the Dδ sets.3
3This corollary generalizes Theorem 1 (b) in Hougaard & Thorlund-Petersen (2001).
11Corollary 2 Let {Fθ}θ∈[0,1] denote the TAL-family, and let δ ∈ (0,1) be
given. Then:
(i) If θ < δ then Fθ ∗
Dδ P.
(ii) If θ > δ then P ∗
Dδ Fθ.
(iii) If θ = δ then Fθ coincides with P on Dδ.
In other words, Corollary 2 says the following. Given a taxation problem
(N,X,y) ∈ X, y − P(N,X,y) L y − Fθ (N,X,y) for all θ ∈ (τ(N,X,y),1]
and y −F θ (N,X,y) L y −P(N,X,y) for all θ ∈ [0,τ(N,X,y)). Finally, if
θ = τ(N,X,y) then P(N,X,y)=Fθ (N,X,y).I np a r t i c u l a rP is more (resp.
less) progressive than the Talmud rule T = F1/2 when τ(N,X,y) < 1
2 (resp.
> 1
2). According to the remark above, this implies that the Proportional rule
is typically more progressive than the Talmud rule.
The following corollary provides some additional information on the dis-
tributive consequences of these rules. In particular, it identiﬁes the preferred
rules in the TAL-family for the poorest and the richest agent in N. Formally:
Corollary 3 Let (N,X,y) ∈ X,a n dθ1, θ2 ∈ [0,1],w h e r eθ1 ≤ θ2.T h e n
F
θ1
1 (N,X,y) ≤ F
θ2
1 (N,X,y) and Fθ1
n (N,X,y) ≥ Fθ2
n (N,X,y).
Proof.
Let (N,X,y) ∈ X and θ1, θ2 ∈ [0,1],w h e r eθ1 ≤ θ2.T h e o r e m 1 s a y s
Fθ2 (N,X,y) L Fθ1 (N,X,y). In particular, F
θ1




















i (N,X,y),i tf o l l o w st h a t
X−Fθ1
n (N,X,y) ≤ X−Fθ2




Corollary 3 says the following. Let (N,X,y) ∈ X be given and consider
the rules in the TAL-family Fθ,f o rθ varying in [0,1]. Higher values of θ yield
an allocation with larger (smaller) shares of the tax burden for the poorest
(resp. richest) agent. Therefore, the most preferred rules by the poorest and
the richest agents are the leveling tax and the head tax, respectively. And
vice versa. These outcomes are of some import for the non-cooperative game
theoretic approach to these type of problems [e.g. Chun (1989), Dagan,
Serrano & Volij (1997), Herrero (2001), Herrero, Moreno-Ternero & Ponti
(2001)].
124 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
T op r o v et h i sr e s u l tw eh a v et oi n t r o d u c esome additional notation and invoke
the results by Hougaard & Thorlund-Petersen (2001).
For each taxation problem (N,X,y) ∈ X we deﬁne the following sets:
• Ω0(N,X,y)={x ∈ Rn :
Sn
i=1 xi = X,a n dxi ≤ yi,f o ra l li =1 ,...,n}.
• Ω0(N,X,y)={x ∈ Rn :
Sn
i=1 xi = X,a n dxi ≥ 0,f o ra l li =1 ,...,n}.
Ω0(N,X,y) is the portion of the hyperplane x1 = X which is bounded
above by the gross income vector y (where x ∈ Rn, 1 =( 1 ,1,...,1),a n dx1 is
the inner product in Rn). Similarly, Ω0(N,X,y) corresponds to the portion
o ft h es a m eh y p e r p l a n ew h i c hi n t e r s e c t st h en o n - n e g a t i v eo r t h a n t .N o t et h a t
Ω0(N,X,y) ∩ Ω0(N,X,y)=Ω(N,X,y) (the set of feasible allocations).
The following lemma summarizes some of the ﬁndings in Hougaard &
Thorlund-Petersen (2001).
Lemma 1 Let (N,X,y) ∈ X a taxation problem. The following statements
hold:
(a) A(N,X,y) L x for all x ∈ Ω0(N,X,y).
(b) y − L(N,X,y) L y − x for all x ∈ Ω0(N,X,y).
We now can prove our theorem:
Theorem 2 Let Fθ1,Fθ2 be two rules in the TAL-family, with θ1,θ2 ∈ [0,1].
Then, Fθ1 ∗ Fθ2 when θ1 ≤ θ2.
Proof.
Let θ1, θ2 ∈ [0,1],w h e r eθ1 ≤ θ2,a n dﬁx a particular taxation problem
(N,X,y) ∈ X. We need to show that y −Fθ1 (N,X,y) L y −Fθ2 (N,X,y),
or equivalently, Fθ2 (N,X,y) L Fθ1 (N,X,y). Several cases are to be con-
sidered.
Case 1.- X ≤ θ1Y . In this case, by the deﬁnition of the TAL-family,
F
θ1
i (N,X,y) ≤ θ1yi ≤ θ2yi, for all i ∈ N. Therefore, Fθ1 (N,X,y) ∈
Ω0 (N,X,θ2y). Now, Lemma 1 (a) implies A(N,X,θ2y) L Fθ1 (N,X,y).
Furthermore, since X ≤ θ2Y ,w eh a v eA(N,X,θ2y)=Fθ2 (N,X,y).A l l
together says that Fθ2 (N,X,y) L Fθ1 (N,X,y), as desired.
Case 2.- X ≥ θ2Y .N o w ,b yt h ed e ﬁnition of the TAL-family, F
θ2
i (N,X,y) ≥
θ2yi ≥ θ1yi,f o ra l li ∈ N. Equivalently, yi − F
θ2
i (N,X,y) ≤ (1 − θ2)yi ≤
(1−θ1)yi, and therefore, Fθ2 (N,X,y)−θ1y ∈ Ω0 (N,X − θ1Y,(1 − θ1)y).A s
a consequence, Lemma 1 (b) implies (1−θ1)y−L(N,X − θ1Y,(1 − θ1)y) L
13(1 − θ1)y − (Fθ2 (N,X,y) − θ1y)=y − Fθ2 (N,X,y).N o w ,s i n c eX ≥ θ1Y ,
we know that θ1y1 +L(N,X − θ1Y,(1 − θ1)y)=Fθ1 (N,X,y),w h i c hs h o w s
that y − Fθ1 (N,X,y) L y − Fθ2 (N,X,y), as desired.
Case 3.- θ1Y< X< θ2Y . In this case the above arguments are no
longer valid.4 Let r1 be the minimum non-negative integer in {0,...,n − 1}
such that X ≥ θ1Y +( 1− θ1)((
Sn
i=r1+1 yi) − (n − r1)yr1+1).5 Furthermore,
let r2 be the minimum non-negative integer in {0,...,n − 1} such that X ≤
θ2((
Sr2
i=1 yi)+( n − r2)yr2+1). As a consequence,
F




where λ and µ are determined to achieve feasibility.6 Several cases need to
be discussed.
Case 3.1.- r1 >r 2.











































i (N,X,y) if and only if
(k − r2)X ≥ (n − r2)θ1(
k [
i=1




4Consider the taxation problem (N,X,y)=( {1,2},11,(10,15)). It is straightforward
to see that F
1
2 (N,X,y)=( 5 ,6) and F
1






2 (N,X,y) > 1
2 · 15,w h i c hs h o w st h a tFθ1 (N,X,y) / ∈ Ω0 (N,X,θ2y). Similarly,
consider the taxation problem (N,X,y)=( {1,2},2.2,(3,5)). It is straightforward to see
that F
1
2 (N,X,y)=( 1 .1,1.1). Then, θ2 = 1
2 < 1
4 = θ1, but F
1
2
2 (N,X,y) < 1
4 · 5,w h i c h
shows that Fθ2 (N,X,y) − θ1y/ ∈ Ω0 (N,X − θ1y,(1 − θ1)y)
5For the sake of completeness, assume y0 =0 .











14Now, since X ≥ θ1Y +( 1− θ1)((
Sn
i=r1+1 yi) − (n − r1)yr1+1),i ts u ﬃces to
show that (k − r2) · [θ1Y +( 1− θ1)((
Sn
i=r1+1 yi) − (n − r1)yr1+1)] ≥ (n −
r2)θ1(
Sk
i=1 yi) − (n − k)θ2(
Sr2
i=1 yi),o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
(n − k)(θ2 − θ1)(
r2 [
i=1
yi)+( k − r2)((
n [
i=r1+1
yi) − (n − r1)yr1+1)
≥ (n − k)(
k [
i=r2+1
yi) − (k − r2)[(
r1 [
i=k+1
yi)+( n − r1)yr1+1].
Now, the right hand side of the last inequality is bounded above by (n −
k)((
Sk
i=r2+1 yi) − (k − r2)yk+1) ≤ 0.S i n c eθ2 ≥ θ1,a n dk − r2,t h ed e s i r e d
inequality holds.









































i (N,X,y) if and only if







−(n − r2)(k − r1)(
n [
i=k+1




As mentioned above, X ≥ θ1Y +( 1− θ1)((
Sn
i=r1+1 yi) − (n − r1)yr1+1).
Then, it suﬃces to show that (n −k)(r1 −r2)[θ1Y +( 1−θ1)((
Sn
i=r1+1 yi) −
(n − r1)yr1+1)] is an upper bound for the right term in the above inequality.
Or, equivalently, (n − r1)(n − k)θ2(
Sr2
i=1 yi) ≥ (n − r1)θ1((
Sr1
i=1 yi) − (r1 −
r2)yr1+1)+f(n,k,r1,r 2,y),w h e r e




+(n − r2)(n − k)(
k [
i=r1+1











i=1 yi and θ2 ≥ θ1, implies the desired inequal-
ity.









for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, which concludes the proof of Case 3.1.
Case 3.2.- r1 <r 2.









































i (N,X,y) ≤ Sk
i=1 F
θ2














Now, X ≤ θ2((
Sr2
i=1 yi) − (n − r2)yr2+1). Thus, as before, it is enough to
show that (k − r1) · [θ2((
Sr2







i=r1+1 yi]+( k − r1)(
Sn
i=k+1 yi),o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,




≥ (n − k)(1− θ2)(
k [
i=r1+1
yi) − (k − r1)[(
n [
i=k+1




Now, the second term in the above inequality is bounded above by (n −
k)(1− θ2)(k − r1)(yk − yk+1), which is a negative amount. Since θ2 ≥ θ1,
the result follows.









































i (N,X,y) if and only if
(n − k)(r2 − r1)X ≤ (n − r2)(k − r1)(
n [
i=k+1











As before, since X ≤ θ2((
Sr2
i=1 yi)−(n−r2)yr2+1),i ts u ﬃces to show that (n−
k)(r1−r2)[θ2((
Sr2
i=1 yi) − (n − r2)yr2+1)] is a lower bound for the right term
in the above inequality. Or, equivalently, (n−r2)(n−k)(θ2−θ1)(
Sr2
i=1 yi) ≥
(n − r2) · g(n,k,r1,r 2,y),w h e r e

















≤ [(k − r1)+θ2(r2 − k)]yk,i ti s
straightforward to see that g(n,k,r1,r 2,y) ≤ 0, which concludes the proof.









for all k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, which concludes the proof of Case 3.2.
Case 3.3.- r1 = r2.


































































yi] − (k − r1)(
n [
i=k+1



















≥ (n − k)yk+1 ≥ (n − k)(
Sk
i=r1+1 yi),w h i c hg i v e st h e
desired inequality.
The proof is in this way completed.
18References
[1] Atkinson, A. B. (1970), On the Measurement of Inequality, Journal of
Economic Theory, 2 : 244-263.
[2] Atkinson, A.B. (1975), The Economics of Inequality,O x f o r dU n i -
versity Press, Oxford.
[3] Aumann, R.J. & Maschler, M. (1985), Game Theoretic Analysis of a
Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic The-
ory, 36 : 195—213.
[4] Chun, Y. (1989), A Noncooperative Justiﬁcation for the Egalitarian
Surplus Sharing, Mathematical Social Sciences, 17 : 245-261.
[5] Dagan, N., Serrano, R. & Volij, O. (1997), A Noncooperative View of
Consistent Bankruptcy Rules, Games and Economic Behavior,1 8:
51-59.
[6] Dalton, H. (1920), The measurement of the inequality of incomes, The
Economic Journal, 30 (119) : 348-361
[ 7 ]D a s g u p t a ,P . S . ,S e n ,A . K .&S t a r r e t ,D .( 1 9 7 3 ) ,N o t e so nt h eM e a s u r e -
ment of Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory,6:1 8 0 - 1 8 7 .
[8] Herrero, C. (2001) Equal Awards Vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bank-
ruptcy, Review of Economic Design, forthcoming.
[9] Herrero, C., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. & Ponti, G. (2001), An Experimental
Study on Bankruptcy Games, Mimeo, University of Alicante.
[10] Hougaard, J.L. & Thorlund-Petersen L. (2001), Bankruptcy rules, In-
equality, and Uncertainty, WP 4-2001, Department of Operations
Management. Copenhagen Business School.
[11] Lorenz, M.O. (1905), Methods of measuring concentration of wealth,
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 9: 209-219.
[12] Moreno-Ternero, J.D. & Villar, A. (2002), The TAL-Family of rules for
Bankruptcy Problems, Mimeo. University of Alicante.
[13] Moulin, H. (1988), Axioms for Cooperative Decision Making,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
19[14] Moulin, H. (2001), Axiomatic Cost and Surplus-Sharing, Chapter 17 of
K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.), The Handbook of Social
Choice and Welfare,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[15] Roemer J.E. (1998), Equality of opportunity, Harvard University
Press. Cambridge Ma.
[16] Rostchild, M. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1973), Some Further Results on the Mea-
surement of Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory, 2 : 225-243.
[17] Sen, A.K. (1973), On Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
[18] Thomson, W. (1995), Axiomatic Analyses of Bankruptcy and Taxation
Problems: A Survey, mimeo, University of Rochester.
[19] Young, P. (1988), Distributive Justice in Taxation, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 44 : 321—335.
[20] Young, P. (1994), Equity, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
20